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Abstract: 
This paper is the first in a symposium of papers that examine the 2009 report by Frank 
Wolak into the New Zealand electricity market. The Wolak report concluded that there had 
been a cumulative total of $4.3b (NZD) of overcharging in the New Zealand wholesale 
market over a period of seven years. In this paper, we introduce the Wolak findings in the 
context of the salient features of the New Zealand market, and explain that this headline 
figure is highly sensitive to some (quite unrealistic) assumptions about the structure of this 
market.  The papers that follow this introduction (Hogan and Jackson, 2011, and Evans and 
Guthrie, 2011) examine Wolak’s methodology and its empirical application. 
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A Critique of Wolak’s Evaluation of the NZ Electricity Market:  
Part 1: Introduction and Overview 
1. Introduction. 
In 2009, the Commerce Commission of New Zealand released “An Assessment of the 
Performance of the New Zealand Wholesale Electricity Market (Wolak, 2009)”, a report it 
had commissioned from Professor Frank Wolak. This report was the result of three years 
work and was part of an investigation that cost some NZ$3.5m. It analysed the extent to 
which electricity generators in New Zealand have exercised market power to achieve 
wholesale electricity prices in excess of the levels that would result from perfect competition. 
While it found no evidence of affiliated actions, the report concluded that there was evidence 
that generators have had an incentive to exercise unilateral market power, and evidence that 
they have exercised that market power. It estimated a counterfactual benchmark of what 
prices would have been in the absence of market power and used this counterfactual to 
conclude that there had been a cumulative total of NZ$4.3b. of overcharging over a period of 
seven years.  
The Wolak report contains three broad strands of empirical evidence that generators 
have exercised unilateral market power in New Zealand. The first strand uses standard 
oligopoly theory to calculate from the observed offers the extent to which firms have had the 
ability and the incentive to exercise unilateral market power. The second strand uses 
regression analysis to estimate the extent to which those measures of market power can 
explain the observed price movements in the New Zealand wholesale market.  The final 
strand uses direct estimates of generators’ short-run marginal cost curves and assumptions 
Evans, Hogan, and Jackson Critique of Wolak’s Evaluation of the NZ Electricity Market 
    2
about demand to calculate the extent to which market prices have exceeded marginal cost 
pricing.  It is this section of the report that generates the estimate of $4.3b. of overcharging.  
This headline figure illustrates the potential import of the Wolak report. Not 
surprisingly, then, this is the part of the report that has received most attention.1 In this paper, 
we summarise and extend various critiques of the method used in developing the counter-
factual to show why we believe that $4.3b. is an overstatement of the amount of market-
power rent earned in the New Zealand wholesale market over the period analysed. The 
remaining two papers in this symposium consider the other two strands of empirical evidence 
presented in the Wolak report.  
Figure 5.12 in the Wolak report, reproduced below, shows the calculation of the $4.3b., 
which is the sum of the red-shaded bars. These bars depict the total payments made to 
generators in excess of those that would have been made under a hypothetical benchmark of 
perfect competition. Total payments to generators are easily observed directly in the available 
data, but the counterfactual benchmark is not and needs to be inferred from a combination of 
data and assumptions about the nature of the market.  
The bulk of the $4.3b was obtained during the three dry-year periods of high wholesale 
prices, in 2001, 2003, and 2006. The high estimated market rents in those years depends on an 
assumption that the very high prices persisting for months during these episodes had no effect 
on demand or consumption of electricity: they also adopt an approach to calculating marginal 
cost that does not properly take into account the effect that fuel and plant availability, reserve 
requirements, transmission constraints and risk has on the cost structures of firms. Partly this 
is may be because of physical and institutional features of the New Zealand electricity market 
that, while not necessarily unique to New Zealand, are not standard in much of the world.  
                                                 
1  See, for example, Electricity Technical Advisory Group (2009), NZIER (2009), and University of Auckland 
(2009),  
Evans, Hogan, and Jackson Critique of Wolak’s Evaluation of the NZ Electricity Market 
In the following section, we describe these relevant features of the New Zealand market. 
In Section 3 we explain how these are relevant to the assessment of the market-rent 
calculations shown in the report’s Figure 5.12. 
 
 
 
2. Relevant New Zealand Electricity Market Characteristics 
The structure of the New Zealand electricity market and its standing relative to other 
electricity markets, is set out by Evans and Meade (2005). The key relevant features are that it 
is an energy-only market, has volatile reservoir inflows and low storage capacity, volatile 
demand that is inelastic in the very short run, and vertical integration of retail and generation. 
    3
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In an energy-only market, the distribution of electricity prices over time, including peak, 
off-peak, and fuel-shortage periods must not only fund the operational costs involved in 
producing electricity, but also provide capital cost recovery to cover the cost of maintaining 
and expanding capacity. While other countries such as Australia and the UK have markets 
designed on a similar energy-only basis, in other jurisdictions, such as those generally found 
in the USA, a two-part payment approach is employed that typically, combines partial 
regulation of wholesale energy prices with either a separate market for capacity or an 
alternative capacity payment scheme.  Where price caps in the primary energy market are 
designed only to permit recovery at the level of SRMC, capacity markets or payment schemes 
are necessary for capital cost recovery.  In New Zealand, as well as in Australia (where the 
price cap is defined not in relation to the SRMC of peaking plant, but in order to achieve a 
certain reliability standard), energy prices in peak periods are expected to rise high enough, 
sufficiently often, to contribute a significant amount to cost recovery for all types of plant at 
all positions in the merit order. 
Electricity demand must equal supply continuously at all points in time and space or 
massive disruption to electricity users and damage to electricity plant will result. Market 
operators achieve this by combining the bids and offers of participants with knowledge of the 
structure and limitations of the transmission network, while simultaneously providing reserve 
and other ancillary services. The predominantly one-dimensional network that is dictated by 
New Zealand’s geographical features and the location of major generation relative to major 
load results in greater system security risks in contrast to more two-dimensional networks in 
which there are multiple paths by which power can move from one location to another.   
The requirement for instantaneous reserves is satisfied by capacity held back from the 
energy market for use in the event that a generation or transmission failure occurs within the 
dispatch period.  Reserves are particularly important in New Zealand because of the large size 
    4
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of individual generation units and of the high-voltage direct-current (HVDC) link connecting 
the North and South islands, relative to load. If the HVDC link fails, there is no other way for 
generation in one island to meet demand in the other, and each island, which is a separate AC 
system, must adjust generation accordingly.  In New Zealand, instantaneous reserve markets 
are cleared in conjunction with the energy market, based on anticipated requirements 
determined in the pre-dispatch process. 
Electricity markets have volatile demand, often brought about by fluctuations in weather 
conditions.  The elasticity of demand follows the classic moré that in the very short run, such 
as within a half-hour trading period, demand is very inelastic, but as the time frame extends 
demand becomes much more elastic. The elasticity of demand is endogenous to the market 
structure because, where price fluctuation is not reduced by price caps, instruments such as 
demand-side management options emerge to mitigate price volatility.2 
The large share of energy provided by hydro generation (55-65 percent of total 
generation depending upon reservoir inflows) combined with low storage capacity (see the 
Electricity Technical Advisory Group (2009)) is a distinctive feature of the New Zealand 
market. This uncertainty requires that generation decisions must be based upon expectations 
about a risky future and not just current weather, demand and storage. This feature is 
important as it means that, for a substantial portion of generation plant, a large component of 
marginal cost—the the option value of a marginal unit of stored fuel—is volatile and not 
directly observable.3 
                                                 
2  If households are excluded from demand management, in New Zealand there remains 65% of demand 
available to raise price elasticity.  In particularly severe dry years, household demand can be and has been 
affected by government conservation schemes. 
3  Throughout this paper we use the term “fuel” to mean any form of stored energy used to generate electricity, 
and so it refers to water stored in hydro reservoirs as well as coal and gas. 
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Finally, another key background feature of the New Zealand market is that it permits 
vertical integration of generation and retail.  This too is the case in other countries, for 
example Spain, but it is not generally the case in the US, where vertical integration is 
commonly not permitted, although it does characterise some municipalities. Hogan and 
Meade (2007) argue that vertical integration does not accentuate market power by generators, 
and may mitigate it. This finding is broadly corroborated by the empirical work of Bushnell, 
Mansur and Saravia (2008). Vertical integration can be viewed as a substitute for generators 
entering long-term full hedge contracts. Both vertical integration and hedge arrangements can 
have the effect of materially reducing the impact of the spot market on participants. To put it 
simply, suppose that 80 percent of electricity is covered by hedge contracts and/or vertical 
integration. Then, for 80 percent of New Zealand’s electricity, the wholesale spot price will 
not directly influence the price paid by final consumers at that time.4 
3. Overview: The Rent Calculation 
While we consider key aspects of Wolak’s analysis in the separate papers that follow, it 
is informative to set out as an overview the basis of his “excess” rent calculation. It subtracts 
from the actual outcome (the factual) an estimated counterfactual series of prices.  
The counterfactual prices are calculated by assuming i) a counterfactual series of 
marginal costs, ii) performance of the transmission grid, iii) plant availability, and iv) demand 
response.  We consider each of these in turn.  
                                                 
4  The quantum of electricity that is hedged is private information, but Wolak was able to extract it using the 
compulsory information acquirement of the Commerce Act 1986: Section 98. It is thought that at least 80 
percent of the electricity transacted is insulated from the immediate spot price.  
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3.1 Marginal Cost.  
For hydro operators, the marginal cost of generating electricity includes the option value 
of retaining water in storage for future use. Evans and Guthrie (2009), argue that generators 
can be viewed as achieving the optimal trade-off between the returns from storing water for 
future generation against the returns from generating now, by treating stored water as an asset. 
Hydro generators base storage and release decisions on the option value, or shadow price, of 
stored water in a dry year, taking into account firm characteristics such as the portfolio 
position, operational constraints and environmental caveats, as well as uncertainty about 
hydrological inflows and demand patterns.  Taking these factors into consideration, the 
reservoir operator will store water if a future attainable use is expected to be more valuable 
than use in the current period. 
The Wolak report does allow some consideration of option value in its calculation of 
marginal cost for hydro stations, but without appropriate consideration of the role of 
uncertainty. Consider the measurement of the opportunity cost of water in a hydro station. By 
assuming the optimal allocation of water to the highest value use, the report assumes that 
hydro station operators know in advance how prices will evolve over a season, so that the 
opportunity cost of water used to generate electricity now is the price that that power could be 
sold for later in the season. This approach ignores the impact of uncertainty and risk aversion. 
While the option value of water retained in a reservoir could be higher or lower than the ex-
post realised value depending on actual inflow eventualities, when reservoir inflows are 
uncertain it will typically be higher as some water is retained by risk averse and over-
contracted firms as insurance against extreme dry-year events.   
In a perfectly competitive market, current and future trade-offs between hydro 
generation and substitute fuels have the effect of valuing water. Hydro offers are based on a 
variety of factors, as described above, which can be summarised by the perceived distribution 
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of marginal water values. When the optimal dispatch is not constrained by plant capacity, 
transmission capacity, storage limits, and the availability of other fuel is not constrained at its 
market price, the shadow price of water in a deterministic world should, if we ignore the value 
of lost load, be capped by the marginal cost of the peaking technology, whether that be a 
generation plant or demand side management option. However, in practice these limits exist, 
and the world is uncertain so decisions may well be socially optimal when taken at an 
unobserved shadow price of stored water, that is (potentially much) larger than the observed 
or reported marginal cost of a peaking technology, and certainly much higher than the 
marginal cost of gas fired plant.  
In contrast, Wolak implicitly assumes that the maximum marginal water value is the 
cost of gas as reported to him by the generators. The reporting was under the Commerce Act 
(Section 98) and we are not privy to it, but it would have been most unlikely to include 
shadow prices generated by fuel availability issues for these are volatile and vary over time 
and with the state of the market.5 In essence, the Wolak Report’s perfectly-competitive 
benchmark counterfactual assumed that the opportunity cost of fuel used in thermal power 
stations is simply the replacement cost of that fuel, and that the opportunity cost of water in a 
hydro station is capped at the highest value in a season of the thermal-station, short-run 
marginal cost calculated using an assumed fuel replacement cost. 
Energy and fuel limits are particularly important in New Zealand as gas and coal storage and 
delivery are also limited.  If there is a shortage of hydro generation, gas and coal shortages 
will also be a possibility and generators will seek to eke out gas supplies based on the 
quantum stored, reservoir levels, and expectations of the future, much the same as for hydro 
                                                 
5  Indeed, under take-or pay gas contracts, which exist in the market, the price per unit of fuel requires 
assumptions to estimate and does not have the meaning of a spot price for gas.. 
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management.6 In other words, for any fuel that is limited in supply, availability has to be 
managed just as it is for hydro. This is implied by “take or pay” fuel contracts that alone 
render Wolak’s measure of marginal cost awry7 as under these contracts thermal stations are 
not able to access significantly more or less fuel according to the particular hydrological 
outcome of the year, and so need to husband their available fuel with an associated 
opportunity cost of use that exceeds simple replacement cost. In this circumstance the 
maximum marginal cost of electricity generation is not the price paid for gas. Instead, it is 
some higher amount that is not calculable independently of the current and future value of 
other fuels and demand side options.8 Thus, the calculation of the marginal cost of other fuels 
in Wolak’s counterfactual is also not independently observable and is under-estimated. 
Finally, it is important to recognise that investment in the electricity market would be 
limited under Wolak’s counterfactual and marginal-cost estimation. In a SRMC-based energy-
only pricing scheme (estimated as Wolak does), practically no firm would have the incentive 
to invest.9 Risk-averse investors require recovery of capital costs with a suitable premium for 
risk, as well as the fixed and variable operating costs they incur in operations. Pricing 
according to Wolak’s short-run-marginal-cost standard limits the operating surplus available 
for fixed costs and capital recovery and therefore cannot support equilibrium investment. 
Where marginal cost includes the opportunity cost of scarcity and a suitable risk premium, 
investment is supported in an energy only market.10  In this setting, firms will invest in 
                                                 
6  Constraints were factors in the high prices of the winter of 2001 when inflows had been very low and gas 
plants had to husband the availability of gas plants (Market Surveillance Committee, 2001). 
7  The point remains, whether or not these contracts permit banking of gas. 
8  The future prices of electricity set an upper bound to marginal cost. But without an independent measure of 
marginal cost, assessing the relationship between price and marginal cost for market power evaluation is 
fraught.  
9  There may be some partial incentives where operating surplus is produced: e.g. if marginal cost is increasing, 
or if the price of electricity is sufficiently above the marginal cost of new plant. This latter possibility is not 
an equilibrium position. 
10  This point goes back to Baumol and Bradford (1970). 
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additional plant when the marginal cost and frequency of scarcity, whether generated by 
energy or capacity concerns, generates sufficient operating surplus to justify new plants. The 
prices generated by Wolak’s counterfactual will not support this criterion.  If electricity prices 
were to equal those in Wolak’s counterfactual, the frequency of shortages would increase 
unless intervention on a non-commercial basis occurred. High prices during scarcity periods 
are essential to pay for all capacity and provide an incentive for investment in new capacity.  
3.2 Transmission.  
Wolak uses bivariate correlations of prices at different locations to conclude that New 
Zealand has “one market” as opposed to regional markets; and thus that plant has access to 
the entire market no matter what location it is in.11 But even if statistical analysis suggests 
that the electricity market is one market most of the time, there are periods in which 
transmission constraints have a material influence on the dispatch process and create price 
differentials. The effect of transmission constraints, which may be relatively modest most of 
the time, is exacerbated when combined with real or anticipated fuel and plant availability 
issues if generators suspect they will not be able to physically hedge loads in different regions 
or even worse suspect there will be an actual shortage unless fuel is conserved within a 
particular island. In a typical dry year in New Zealand, the reality of the HVDC link being at 
full capacity in particular scenarios is priced into the value of water, and hydro producers will 
conserve greater quantities of water than they would if the link was unlimited. The effect of 
this measure is to increase water values, resulting in the use of alternative generation, which 
helps assist a severe crisis in the same way demand response does.  Whether or not the crisis 
eventuates, the possibility of the crisis must be considered.  Further evidence that the 
                                                 
11  The bivariate approach is inferior to consideration of regional markets jointly. Evans, Guthrie and Videbeck 
(2007) use a principal components approach and find the same result as Wolak to 2006 across 7 nodes 
considered jointly.  
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vertically integrated firms believe transmission constraints to be a significant issue is the 
geographical market structure of the firms, each hedging their own retail base with near by 
generation.  This would not be necessary if the market were consistently a nationwide market.   
The long thin nature of the New Zealand transmission network makes the likelihood of 
bottlenecks more likely than in a network with a more two dimensional structure. The New 
Zealand system relies heavily on a high voltage direct current link (HVDC) between the north 
and south islands, which connects two otherwise separate AC networks. Apart from the 
considerable reserve issues this presents, the limit on transmission between islands does in 
itself place restrictions on the optimal dispatch of generation plant. This results in 
transmission constraints that invalidate the water allocation mechanism used in the Wolak 
report, and necessarily reduces the ability of hydro generation to smooth marginal costs 
throughout the period of the study. 
3.3 Plant Availability.  
The Wolak counterfactual also assumed greater utilisation of existing plant capacity 
than had been the case in the factual, arguing that there was excess capacity to such an extent 
that prices should be equated to the counterfactual’s marginal cost. The report claimed that, at 
all times in the period of the data being considered, total output from all power stations was 
considerably less than the implied capacity derived by considering the sum of the maximum 
output of each individual station over the period in question. This conclusion of permanent 
excess capacity does not consider the already-mentioned issues of fuel availability or 
transmission constraints, and also ignores the implication of ancillary service requirements, all 
of which may restrict plants to generate below their rated capacity.  
The New Zealand wholesale market combines a market for power, with other markets 
and schemes to provide ancillary services. Most notably there are two classes of instantaneous 
    11
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reserve, as well as a frequency-keeping role that need to be provided for.  Reserve provision is 
relatively less important in larger two dimensional networks, which by virtue of their size and 
geographical shape, are less susceptible to adverse effects from transmission failure.  Because 
the NZ transmission network features an HVDC link which joins two separate AC networks, 
the traditional (N-1) reliability standard has to be augmented to include inflows from the other 
island as a potential source of failure to be considered, along with the largest generation in 
each island at any given time. As plant operations vary and power sometimes flows north and 
sometimes, albeit less frequently, south, the amount of capacity required for reserve in each 
island will necessarily fluctuate over time. The quantity of reserve required in each island 
depends on the dispatch of plant in different locations, and it is possible that reserve 
requirements in one island can exceed generation in that island.    
In periods of system stress with fuel shortage and constrained HVDC transfers, the 
reserve requirements in the receiving island can be particularly onerous.  Wolak’s analysis of 
excess capacity does not imply that the apparent excess capacity is actually excess and 
therefore that we should expect a competitive market to yield prices equal to short-run 
marginal cost.12 
3.4 Demand Response 
Independently of issues surrounding marginal cost estimation, the effect of the 
transmission network, and the effect of ancillary services requirements, elastic demand would 
yield contractual and/or spot market consumption responses to high prices and mitigate 
increases in marginal costs in times of fuel and plant scarcity.  The counterfactual of the 
Wolak report rejected this possibility and assumed that demand is perfectly inelastic, ignoring 
                                                 
12  The Market Surveillance Committee (2001) report that this occurred in the winter of 2001. 
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the implications of sustained high prices for both spot market purchasers as well as any 
possible demand-side management options. This may be a more reasonable assumption when 
describing the performance of the market in the very short term, such as unanticipated brief 
shocks to supply within a half-hour trading period, because with sellers submitting supply 
offers every half-hour, and buyers simply drawing as much power as they wish, the market 
price is realised ex post to equate aggregate demand to aggregate supply at each node, giving 
very little opportunity for response.  In fact, because of the basic structure of market 
clearance, in the short term, demand is insensitive to price as participants are not even able to 
easily calculate the price before using the power even if the wished to do so.13  
But the general nature of energy crises in NZ is that there is a shortage of hydro inflows, 
and this energy shortage develops over a period of several weeks or months in a dry year, so 
that demand can and does have the opportunity to respond to actual and forecast increases in 
the wholesale price in a variety of ways. First, there is a small percentage of the final demand 
that buys directly from the wholesale market and so has an incentive to reduce demand when 
prices rise. Second, it is profitable for hedged parties to put electricity back into the market 
rather than consume it when prices are high. Third, retail companies offer financial incentives 
to customers to reduce demand.  Finally, in the past, and certainly within the study period of 
the report, the threat of supply shortages has led to government-sponsored conservation 
campaigns, which have achieved significant consumption reductions. For all the above 
reasons, there were demand responses in the high price episodes of Figure 1 and this was 
precisely because of the high prices experienced in these episodes.  Using the same transacted 
quantity in the factual and counterfactual implies either a) high prices resulting from the 
claimed exercise of market power resulted in no social inefficiency, just a largely internal 
                                                 
13  Although, as pointed out above, mechanisms can be instituted that engender some intra-trading-period 
demand response.  
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transfer from the retail to the wholesale arms of vertically integrated gentailers, or b) the 
dispatch implied by the counterfactual would be insufficient to fulfil the demand that would 
have arisen from the proposed lower prices in his counterfactual. In the second case, shortages 
are implied, and in this scenario these should have been valued and included as a cost in the 
counterfactual at the value of lost load.  The irony of the report and its view of New Zealand’s 
power crises is that precisely because generators, both individually and collectively, do 
consider the potential cost and risk of shortages in dry years, they raised prices accordingly, 
and as a result the crises were largely avoided in the period of the study. 
4. Summary 
These four critiques and the fact that the rents only appear at times of fuel scarcity 
overwhelmingly point in the direction that the estimate of overcharging attributable to market 
power in the Wolak report is too high14, but they don’t provide an alternative measure. There 
remain the other strands of argument and empirical evidence in the report that Wolak holds to 
be consistent with the high prices in dry years being the result of market power. This leads the 
authors of the NZIER discussion document prepared for the Major Electricity User’s Group 
(NZIER, 2009), to comment:  
Wolak’s analysis has drawn a lot of criticism, not all of it valid. Most 
criticisms have been directed at the way in which he constructs competitive 
benchmark prices and thereby estimates market power rents. Criticism of this 
additional step in his analysis does not detract from the earlier steps in his 
methodology of examining the slopes of residual demand curves to determine 
ability and incentive to influence market clearing prices. This basic methodology 
is well-established and widely recognised and applied worldwide to assess 
competition in short-term wholesale markets. 
 
                                                 
14  Of course for the excessive prices to affect consumer welfare their effect on retail and hedge prices would 
have to be assessed.    
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In the papers that follow, we turn our attention to these measures of the ability and 
incentive to exercise unilateral market power. Hogan and Jackson (2011) examines the 
construction of the measures of firms’ incentives to exercise market power; Evans and 
Guthrie (2011) examine the Report’s econometric evidence linking those measures to 
wholesale prices. We explain that even the concession of the NZIER statement is not 
warranted or even accurate; for we show that the methodology has no logical basis as it 
is specified and applied in the Wolak Report. In consequence, the approach is not 
applicable in the assessment of energy-only electricity markets. Whether a modified 
version of the approach is useful for other electricity markets would depend on the 
specific structure of those markets. 
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